A transdiagnostic investigation of 'theory of mind' and 'jumping to conclusions' in patients with persecutory delusions by Corcoran, R et al.
A transdiagnostic investigation of ‘theory of mind’
and ‘jumping to conclusions’ in patients with
persecutory delusions
R. Corcoran1*, G. Rowse2, R. Moore3, N. Blackwood3, P. Kinderman4, R. Howard3, S. Cummins5
and R. P. Bentall6
1 Division of Psychiatry, School of Community Health Sciences, University of Nottingham, A Floor, South Block, Queen’s Medical Centre,
Nottingham, UK
2 Department of Clinical Psychology, University of Sheﬃeld, Sheﬃeld, UK
3 Section of Old Age Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, DeCrespigny Park, London, UK
4 Department of Clinical Psychology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
5 School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, UK
6 School of Psychology, University of Wales Bangor, Bangor, Gwynedd, UK
Background. A tendency to make hasty decisions on probabilistic reasoning tasks and a diﬃculty attributing mental
states to others are key cognitive features of persecutory delusions (PDs) in the context of schizophrenia. This study
examines whether these same psychological anomalies characterize PDs when they present in the context of psychotic
depression.
Method. Performance on measures of probabilistic reasoning and theory of mind (ToM) was examined in ﬁve
subgroups diﬀering in diagnostic category and current illness status.
Results. The tendency to draw hasty decisions in probabilistic settings and poor ToM tested using story format feature
in PDs irrespective of diagnosis. Furthermore, performance on the ToM story task correlated with the degree of distress
caused by and preoccupation with the current PDs in the currently deluded groups. By contrast, performance on the
non-verbal ToM task appears to be more sensitive to diagnosis, as patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders
perform worse on this task than those with depression irrespective of the presence of PDs.
Conclusions. The psychological anomalies associated with PDs examined here are transdiagnostic but diﬀerent
measures of ToM may be more or less sensitive to indices of severity of the PDs, diagnosis and trait- or state-related
cognitive eﬀects.
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Introduction
Psychopathological research conducted over the past
two decades has undermined the view that delusions
are un-understandable (e.g. Bentall et al. 2001 ;
Blackwood et al. 2001). In particular there are two key
reasoning anomalies that have been found in adults
with delusions. First, people with persecutory de-
lusions (PDs) have theory of mind (ToM) diﬃculties
in that they have trouble accurately inferring other
people’s beliefs and intentions (e.g. Corcoran et al.
1995 ; Corcoran & Frith, 2003; Harrington et al. 2005).
Second, deluded individuals have a tendency to jump
to conclusions (JTC) on the basis of insuﬃcient infor-
mation when reasoning in probabilistic contexts (e.g.
Huq et al. 1988 ; Garety et al. 1991 ; Dudley et al. 1997).
This characteristic style of decision-making seems to
apply to delusions irrespective of content and, as
Freeman (2007) notes, there has been little research
exploring the JTC bias in relation to PDs speciﬁcally.
The balance of evidence suggests that the JTC ﬁnding
is robust and has been found to relate particularly to
delusional conviction (e.g. Garety & Freeman, 1999;
Garety et al. 2005 ; Peters & Garety, 2006). This con-
trasts with the ﬁndings on ToM reasoning which are
not so well replicated but which are theoretically
compelling in their account of the psychological ori-
gins of PDs in particular (for a review, see Harrington
et al. 2005). While it is clear that neither of these
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reasoning anomalies can comprehensively account for
the generation and maintenance of PDs (e.g. Bentall
et al. in press) it seems likely that they both contribute
to paranoid ideation.
The vast majority of the studies conducted to date
on these psychological variables have focused on
schizophrenia as a diagnostic category. However, the
context within which psychological models of de-
lusional processes have grown over the last 15 years
or so has been one which emphasizes the symptoms
of psychosis over the diagnosis of a psychotic illness.
This has been driven by compelling theoretical reasons
which question the utility of methods relying on data
gathered from groups of patients for whom the diag-
nosis is often the only shared characteristic. Instead,
psychologists have argued that the best way to ad-
vance understanding of psychosis is to take a symp-
tom-based approach. Indeed, it is clear that just such
an approach has led to signiﬁcant advances in our
understanding of the psychological basis of psychotic
symptoms (e.g. Frith, 1992 ; Bentall, 2003). Of course,
a strict symptom-based approach, if correct, implies
that the psychological bases of a psychotic symptom
should be the same irrespective of the diagnostic con-
text in which it is seen and PDs are found in several
other diagnostic groups including aﬀective disorder.
The study reported in this paper is the ﬁrst to investi-
gate whether the drawing of hasty decisions in prob-
abilistic settings and poor ToM are seen in PDs across
diagnostic categories.
Method
Participants
A total of 115 patients in four groups were recruited
from in-patient and out-patient clinics in South
London and the North West of England. Informed
consent was obtained using procedures agreed by a
multi-centre research ethics committee. The currently
paranoid group consisted of 26 male and 13 female
patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia,
schizoaﬀective disorder or delusional disorder who
were experiencing PDs as assessed by the endorse-
ment of the Schedules for Clinical Assessment in
Neuropsychiatry (SCAN; WHO, 1997) item 19.012
[‘Does anyone seem to be trying to harm you (trying to
poison or kill you?’)] at interview, examination of case
notes and endorsement of item 4 (‘Do you ever feel as
if you are being persecuted in some way?’) on the
Peters Delusions Inventory [PDI ; Peters et al. (1999)].
They had a mean age of 33.95 years (S.D.=8.38) and a
mean intelligence quotient (IQ) assessed by the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler,
1999) of 92.18 (S.D.=10.74). Their mean age of illness
onset was 23.00 years (S.D.=7.33), and they were in
receipt of a mean antipsychotic dosage of 417.13 mg
chlorpromazine (CPZ) equivalent (S.D.=510.51). The
mean number of other positive symptoms present in
this group was 0.85 (S.D.=0.90).
The remitted paranoid group consisted of 18 male
and 11 female schizophrenia spectrum patients who
had experienced PDs in the past as evidenced by en-
dorsement of SCAN item 19.012 for a representative
illness period, examination of case notes and en-
dorsement of item 4 on the PDI for the representative
period identiﬁed by the SCAN. However, participants
in this group indicated that they did not currently feel
paranoid and that they had not suﬀered from PDs for
at least the past fortnight. The current status of these
patients was conﬁrmed by case note examination
and/or by clinical staﬀ. Patients in this group did
report the presence of other positive symptoms, no-
tably auditory hallucinations. Their mean age was
34.66 years (S.D.=10.35) ; their mean IQ was 98.38
(S.D.=13.17) ; their mean age of illness onset was
21.82 years (S.D.=5.81) and they were in receipt of a
mean of 227.78 mg CPZ equivalent of antipsychotic
medication (S.D.=261.14). The mean number of other
positive symptoms present in this group was 0.72
(S.D.=0.96).
A paranoid depressed group consisted of 11 male
and nine female patients with a primary DSM-IV
diagnosis of major depression, currently experiencing
PDs as indicated by the SCAN. They had a mean
age of 36.00 years (S.D.=10.11), a mean IQ of 98.50
(S.D.=15.75), a mean age of illness onset of 23.93 years
(S.D.=11.63) and were in receipt of a mean of 17.50 mg
CPZ equivalent of antipsychotic medication (S.D.=
37.36). The mean number of other positive symptoms
present in this group was 1.05 (S.D.=0.99).
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences existed in terms of the
number of other positive symptoms assessed to be
present by the SCAN between the three psychotic pa-
tient groups [i.e. depersonalization, hallucinations,
perceptual experiences ; F(2, 85)=0.706, N.S.]. The
presence of clear negative signs of psychosis (i.e.
underactivity, slow speech, poverty of speech or
blunted aﬀect as assessed by the SCAN) or overt
formal thought disorder were exclusion criteria for the
three psychotic patient groups.
A non-psychotic depressed group consisted of nine
male and 18 female patients with a diagnosis of major
depression and not experiencing PDs. Their mean age
was 48.37 years (S.D.=10.97), their mean IQ was 108.22
(S.D.=12.99), their mean age of onset was 29.11 years
(S.D.=14.45), and they were in receipt of a mean dose
of 5.55 mg CPZ equivalent of antipsychotic medication
(S.D.=28.87).
A healthy adult group of 14 males and 19
females, recruited by advertisement, had a mean age
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of 39.03 years (S.D.=13.96) and a mean IQ of 108.64
(S.D.=14.48). The initial screening questions from
the SCAN were used to determine that they were
symptom free.
Measures
A version of the probabilistic reasoning task devel-
oped by Phillips & Edwards (1966), commonly known
as the ‘beads in a jar task’, was used to investigate the
tendency to ‘ jump to conclusions’ when considering
neutral stimuli. This task was originally used to in-
vestigate probabilistic reasoning in deluded patients
by Huq et al. (1988) and has enjoyed widespread use
since (e.g. Garety et al. 2005). The proportion of the two
coloured beads in the jars in this version was 60 :40
with the majority colour being yellow in one jar and
black in the other. The participants were shown the
order in which beads were drawn from one of the two
jars until they felt conﬁdent that they knew which of
the jars the beads were being drawn from. The number
of beads requested before reaching a decision and the
jar chosen were recorded. Each participant was shown
three sequences of black and yellow beads which had
been randomly determined prior to commencement
of the study and which were held constant across
participants.
A social version of the ‘beads in a jar’ task devel-
oped by Dudley et al. (1997) was used as a second
measure of the tendency to JTC when considering
more salient information. In this task participants
were presented with two surveys containing 100
comments about a person. They were told that survey
A contained 60 negative and 40 positive comments,
while survey B contained 60 positive and 40 negative
comments. Participants could see as many comments
as they needed before deciding which of the two sur-
veys they came from. The number of comments re-
quested before reaching a decision and the survey
chosen were recorded. The same three random se-
quences used as for the ‘beads’ task were used for
each participant.
Six ToM stories developed by J. S. Snowden et al.
(unpublished) were used to assess understanding of
false belief and deception to second-order level and
to provide measures of narrative memory and non-
mental state inference capacity. These stories have
recently been used by Moore et al. (2006) in a
study examining PDs in people with very-late-onset
schizophrenia-like psychosis and are similar in format
to those previously used by Frith & Corcoran (1996)
except that they develop from ﬁrst- (when the contents
of a single person’s mind must be inferred) to second-
order ToM (where the contents of two people’s minds
must be inferred) within each story. The stories were
read out to participants accompanied by a set of
cartoon pictures depicting events in the story. At set
points during the course of the story participants were
asked questions to assess ToM, narrative memory
and non-mental state inference skills which examined
the ability to draw inferences from the text beyond
what was actually stated but which did not involve
an inference about the contents of the characters’
minds.
Finally, a false-belief picture-sequencing task was
used as a non-verbal measure of ToM (Langdon et al.
1997). Following two practice sequences, participants
were presented with four stories involving a person
acting on a false belief. The cards were presented in a
ﬁxed random order and participants were instructed
to put the cards into the right order so that they would
tell a story. The standard scoring system devised by
Langdon et al. (1997) was used.
Analysis strategy
In the ﬁrst instance analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with planned contrasts was used to test for group
diﬀerences on the four reasoning tasks. The ﬁrst con-
trast compared groups with current PDs with those
without. Contrast 2 compared the performance of
patients with PDs in the context of schizophrenia
spectrum with those with PDs in the context of de-
pression. Contrast 3 compared the performance of the
remitted paranoid patients with that of the non-
psychotic depressed patients and the healthy adults
and the ﬁnal contrast compared the performance of
the non-psychotic depressed patients with that of the
healthy adults. It was expected that contrast 1 would
produce a statistically signiﬁcant result while con-
trasts 2–4 would prove to be non-signiﬁcant. Pre-
liminary analyses prior to ANOVA showed that the
beads in the jar task and the ToM stories task were
associated with between-group heterogeneity of
variance [Levene’s statistic beads (4, 140)=2.403, p=
0.053 ; Levene’s statistic ToM stories (4, 139)=3.014,
p=0.02]. Therefore, the Brown–Forsythe robust test
for the equality of means (BF) will be reported for the
four experimental tasks as it is recommended for use
with ANOVA in preference to the F statistic when
variances are unequal between groups and where the
data are skewed as is the case with all four tasks
(Clinch & Keselman, 1988).
Preliminary analyses of the data indicated that the
assumptions with respect to the use of linear re-
gression were not violated, with plots of the residuals
indicating that these were normally distributed for all
four measures, and the Cook’s distance statistics in-
dicating that outliers were not exerting an undue in-
ﬂuence on regression equations. Collinearity statistics
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(tolerance and variance inﬂation factors) were all
acceptable. Therefore a series of linear regressions
using the enter method are reported which investigate
possibly confounding factors such as between-group
diﬀerences in IQ, age and gender. For these analyses
three dummy variables were created to enable clinical
status to be considered as predictor variables. These
were whether or not each case was currently paranoid
(paranoid schizophrenia+paranoid depressed versus
the other groups), whether or not each case had ever
been paranoid (paranoid schizophrenia+paranoid
depressed+remitted paranoid versus the other groups)
and whether or not each case was currently depressed
(paranoid depressed+depressed versus the other
groups). Other predictor variables were maleness, age,
and IQ. Additionally, for the ToM stories, the per-
centage correct on the narrative memory questions
and the percentage correct on the non-mental state
inference questions were also included.
Finally, separate correlation analyses were con-
ducted to examine the relationship between perform-
ance on the tasks, antipsychotic medication dosage
(expressed as CPZ equivalents), and the conviction,
distress and preoccupation scales of the PDI (each
measured on 1–5 scales) in the groups for whom these
variables are relevant.
The performance of each group on the measures
and their background demographics can be seen in
Table 1.
Results
Jumping to conclusions
Performance on the two measures of probabilistic
reasoning correlated signiﬁcantly in these participants
(r=0.73, p<0.001).
The ANOVA ﬁndings relating to performance on
the beads in the jar task were consistent with the hy-
pothesis with a signiﬁcant overall eﬀect for group [BF
(4, 97.9)=4.436, p<0.005]. The planned contrasts in-
dicated that contrast 1 was signiﬁcant at the p<0.001
level, indicating that the groups with current PDs
tended to draw conclusions more hastily on this task
compared with the other groups. As expected, con-
trasts 2–4 were non-signiﬁcant for this task. The re-
gression analysis for the beads task was signiﬁcant
[r2=0.16, F(6, 137)=4.27, p<0.001]. The signiﬁcant
predictors of performance on this task were age
(b=x0.19, t=x2.22, p<0.03) and currently paranoid
status (b=x0.35 ; t=x3.1, p<0.003).
The results of the social probabilistic task were
consistent with the beads task but not as compelling.
There was an overall trend indicating between-group
diﬀerences using ANOVA [BF (4, 103.39)=1.99,
p=0.1]. Mean scores clearly indicated that those with
current PDs were doing less well on this task and this
was supported by a signiﬁcant result for planned
contrast 1 (p<0.01). As expected, contrasts 2–4 were
non-signiﬁcant. The regression analysis for this task
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the groups and their performance on the cognitive measures
Group
Currently
paranoid
(schizophrenic)
Remitted
paranoid
(schizophrenic)
Currently
paranoid
(depressed)
Non-psychotic
(depressed)
Healthy
adult p
Age, years 33.95 (8.4) 34.7 (10.3) 36.0 (10.0) 48.4 (11.0) 39.0 (14.0) <0.001
Gender, % male 67 62 55 33 42 <0.05
Current IQ 92.2 (10.7) 98.5 (13.2) 98.5 (15.7) 108.2 (13.0) 108.6 (14.5) <0.001
Beads task, mean
draws to decision
3.1 (2.7) 5.7 (4.6) 3.95 (1.9) 5.1 (2.2) 5.6 (3.2) <0.005
Social task, mean
draws to decision
3.3 (2.4) 4.8 (4.6) 3.4 (2.1) 5.0 (4.0) 4.9 (3.1) <0.1
Theory of mind stories,
mean percentage score
78.4 (17.3) 86.0 (15.1) 82.9 (11.6) 90.7 (11.1) 90.2 (11.1) <0.002
Memory, mean
percentage score
94.0 (9.2) 92.0 (11.9) 95.4 (6.5) 97.8 (3.8) 98.7 (3.0) <0.006
Non-mental state inference,
percentage score
85.0 (12.4) 86.6 (12.5) 86.6 (13.7) 91.7 (11.3) 96.2 (5.9) <0.001
False-belief picture-sequencing
score
4.4 (1.4) 4.4 (1.3) 4.9 (1.3) 5.0 (1.2) 5.3 (1.2) <0.025
IQ, Intelligence quotient.
Values are means (standard deviations) except for gender percentage.
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was signiﬁcant [r2=0.13, F(6, 136)=3.49, p<0.005],
with IQ signiﬁcantly predicting performance (b=0.24,
t=2.6, p<0.02) and current paranoid status just failing
to reach signiﬁcance at p<0.05 (b=x0.20, t=x1.77,
p<0.08).
Theory of mind
Performance on the two measures of ToM correlated
signiﬁcantly in these participants (r=0.41, p<0.001).
The ANOVA ﬁndings relating to performance on
ToM stories task were consistent with the hypothesis
with a signiﬁcant overall eﬀect for group [BF
(4, 127.96)=4.9, p<0.002]. The planned contrasts
indicated that contrast 1 was signiﬁcant at the
p<0.001 level, indicating that the groups with current
PDs tended to score lower on this task than the
other groups. As predicted, contrasts 2–4 were non-
signiﬁcant. The regression analysis for this task
was signiﬁcant [r2=0.35, F(8, 134)=9.01, p<0.001].
The signiﬁcant predictors of performance were IQ
(b=x0.028, t=3.32, p<0.002), current paranoid sta-
tus (b=x0.25, t=x2.49, p<0.02) and performance on
the narrative memory questions within the task
(b=0.37, t=4.42, p<0.001).
The results of the false-belief picture-sequencing
task were rather diﬀerent to those of the stories task.
While for this task the overall ANOVA was again
signiﬁcant [BF (4, 132.68)=2.92, p<0.025], this was
accounted for by contrast 3 (p<0.02), indicating that
the remitted paranoid patients performed worse on
this task than the depressed patients and the healthy
adults. Contrasts 1, 2 and 4 were all non-signiﬁcant for
this task. The regression analysis for this task was also
signiﬁcant [r2=0.25, F(6, 140)=7.83, p<0.001], with
age (b=x0.23, t=x2.82, p<0.01) and IQ (b=0.39,
t=4.71, p<0.001) predicting performance on this task.
Having a history of paranoid delusions just failed to
signiﬁcantly predict performance on this task
(b=x0.214, t=x1.90, p=0.059) and no other inde-
pendent variables proved to be signiﬁcant predictors.
Correlation of task performance with medication
dosage, conviction, preoccupation and distress
as measured by the PDI
A summary of these ﬁndings can be found in Table 2.
Medication dosage expressed as CPZ equivalents
was only considered for the groups with current
psychosis or a history of psychosis, as the other groups
were not taking antipsychotic medication. No signiﬁ-
cant correlations were found between performance on
any of the four experimental tasks and medication
dosage.
The conviction, preoccupation and distress scales of
the PDI were considered in the groups who were cur-
rently expressing PDs. As shown in Table 2, there
were no signiﬁcant correlations between any of these
PDI severity scales and performance on the beads task,
the social version of the beads task or the picture-
sequencing task. Modest but signiﬁcant correlations
were found between performance on the ToM stories
and the preoccupation and distress subscales but not
the conviction subscale.
Discussion
These results replicate previous ﬁndings showing
that people with PDs in the context of schizophrenia
spectrum disorders tend to make hasty decisions on
probabilistic reasoning tasks (Garety & Freeman, 1999)
and have diﬃculty inferring the beliefs and intentions
of others (e.g. Frith & Corcoran, 1996). This study is,
however, the ﬁrst to demonstrate that both of these
cognitive tendencies are transdiagnostic features of
PDs. The second contrast of the planned comparisons
Table 2. Correlations between task performance, medication dosage and the subscales of the PDI
Medication
dosage PD conviction PD preoccupation PD distress
Probabilistic reasoning
task performance
0.046 N.S. 0.054 N.S. x0.035 N.S. x0.16 N.S.
Social probabilistic reasoning
task performance
x0.095 N.S. x0.129 N.S. x0.15 N.S. x0.11 N.S.
ToM stories
performance
x0.064 N.S. 0.197 N.S. 0.337, p=0.01 0.298, p=0.024
False-belief picture-sequencing
performance
x0.176 N.S. 0.058 N.S. x0.001 N.S. x0.138 N.S.
PDI, Peters Delusions Inventory ; PD, persecutory delusions ; N.S., non-signiﬁcant ; ToM, theory of mind.
Values are correlations (probabilities).
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analyses consistently failed to demonstrate any dif-
ferences in performance across the tasks between the
patients with PDs in the context of schizophrenia
spectrum disorders and those with PDs in the context
of aﬀective disorder. Thus, the ﬁnding indicates that
the same level of diﬃculty on these tasks exists in
patients with aﬀective disorder as exists in patients
with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Recently,
Moore et al. (2006) have shown that ToM diﬃculties
but not the tendency to JTC was a feature of PDs in
the context of very-late-onset schizophrenia-like
psychosis. The authors accounted for the null ﬁnding
on the JTC task by arguing that any diﬀerence was
over-ridden by general age-related changes in higher-
order cognition, as their comparison groups were
matched for age with their psychosis group.
The regression analyses demonstrated that per-
formance on these measures is inﬂuenced by
demographic variables (in particular age) and cog-
nitive ability. However, the speciﬁc transdiagnostic
associations with PDs survived the eﬀects of these
confounding variables. For three of the four tests ex-
amined (the two probabilistic reasoning tasks and the
ToM stories), abnormal performance was associated
with current delusional state, indicating a clear state-
related cognitive dysfunction associated with PDs
irrespective of diagnosis. While it is notable that the
performance on the JTC task did not correlate with
the delusional conviction component of the PDI as has
been previously reported (e.g. Garety et al. 2005),
the fact that the performance on the ToM stories task
correlated signiﬁcantly with the PDI subscales of
preoccupation and distress supports the state-related
nature of performance on this verbal ToM task.
However, for the false-belief picture-sequencing task
there was some evidence to support a trait eﬀect both
in the ANOVA where the only signiﬁcant contrast
showed that the remitted paranoid patients performed
this task worse than the non-psychotic depressed and
the healthy adults. Marginal support for this ﬁnding
was seen in the regression analyses where having a
history of PDs just failed to reach signiﬁcance at the
0.05 level as a predictor of performance on this task.
The idea that the nature of the ToM dysfunction in
schizophrenia can be distinguished in terms of state
and trait requires further exploration, as it could
resolve inconsistent ﬁndings in the earlier literature
exploring this matter (see Harrington et al. 2005). It is
possible that the non-verbal nature of this task makes
it less sensitive to any further deleterious eﬀects of
acute episodes of PDs. Furthermore, there is evidence
in the data that the false-belief picture-sequencing task
may be more sensitive to diagnosis than to the pres-
ence of PDs per se. Examination of the data provide in
Table 1 shows that on this task the remitted paranoid
and the currently paranoid patients with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia are both, in fact, performing poorly
and at the same level while the performance of the two
depressed groups is also comparable and somewhat
better than that seen in the context of schizophrenia. It
may be that this task is sensitive to diagnosis because
of its strong sequencing and problem-solving com-
ponents which uncover more general cognitive diﬃ-
culties associated with the diagnosis of schizophrenia.
Had we included the logical sequencing stories that
Langdon et al. (1997) devised as part of the picture-
sequencing task, we could have explored this issue
further. Unfortunately, constraints of time and the
consideration of patients’ tolerance to the battery
dictated the exclusion of this measure in this study.
The fact that the probabilistic reasoning task ﬁnd-
ings were clearly state related in this study with
no evidence in support of trait eﬀects on this task
does not support other research where authors
have reported that hasty decisions are also taken by
participants who are vulnerable to psychosis (Van
Dael et al. 2006 ; Freeman, 2007). It is unclear why
these ﬁndings diﬀer but it may reﬂect the diﬀerent
methodologies used.
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that the same
underlying reasoning diﬃculties that are associated
with PDs in the context of schizophrenia spectrum
disorders are also associated with PDs in the context of
depression. While it is clear that the tendency to JTC is
related to the presence of current delusions (i.e. a state
eﬀect), there is evidence in this study to suggest that
false-belief picture sequencing may be more sensitive
to diagnosis and thus may be indicative of trait-related
cognitive features of paranoid schizophrenia. Thus it
seems that the generic ToM skill may be a cognitive
marker of paranoid schizophrenia which undergoes
further decline during acute episodes. It is possible
that verbal ToM tasks may be more sensitive to
this state-related decline than non-verbal ToM tasks.
As the diagnostic groups were well categorized in
this study and since no diﬀerences existed for the
presence of other signs and symptoms of psychosis,
these transdiagnostic ﬁndings relating to PDs are
compelling.
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